40 años de democracia y posguerra de Malvinas : el juego de dilatar la cuestión de la soberanía (1965-2019)

Abstract

We propose to investigate two questions that we consider central to the analysis of the recent history of the Malvinas issue: on the one hand, the treatment of the Argentine governments to the claim of sovereignty (before and after the 1982 war) and, on the other, the political strategy of British expansion in the Malvinas and the South Atlantic Ocean. Both dimensions must be analyzed juxtaposingly, given the relationship between the ways Argentina advocated for sovereignty and the way in which Great Britain advanced its strategy of control, exploration and exploitation of the strategic resources provided by the usurped territory. Consequently, the ways to delay the treatment of sovereignty. We start from a hypothesis that indicates that the negotiation period of the years 1965-1982 establishes the bases for understanding the marginsof rapprochement and the British control strategy. The factor of hydrocarbon, mining and fishing resources, since 1975, will condition the terms of any negotiation or rapprochement, not only for that period but for the one initiated after the 1982 war.