Paradigmas filosóficos : ¿Puede trabajarse kuhnianamente en filosofía? Acerca de “Inconmensurabilidad teórica y comparabilidad empírica

Abstract

It is often assumed that analytic philosophy cannot be treated in a Kuhnian way, since what characterizes philosophical practice is not a disciplinary matrix with paradigmatic exemplars of theoretical and empirical problem solving. We propose to challenge this assumption by arguing that at least in some areas of analytic philosophy one can find disciplinary matrices in the Kuhnian sense and, above all, exemplary cases that give rise to a metatheoretical problem-solving program. In particular, we will focus on meta-theoretical structuralism and its notion of T-theoricity. We will show that the work of historical-philosophical analysis carried out by Lorenzano (2008) is a paradigmatic example that has been replicated by several subsequent works, extending the range of application of the disciplinary matrix.